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Abstract
We document a positive relation between network centrality and risk-adjusted performance in
a delegated investment management setting. More connected managers take more portfolio risk
and receive higher investor flows, consistent with these managers improving their ability to exploit
investment opportunities through their network connections. Greater network connections are
shown to be particularly important in reducing the diseconomies-of-scale for large managers who
are well-connected. We also use the exogenous merger of two investment consultants, which creates
a sudden change in the network connections of the managers they oversee, to provide evidence that
a greater number of connections translates into better portfolio performance.
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1 Introduction
Modern delegated portfolio management, in the pension, foundation, and endowment sectors, involves
a complex network of investment managers who each oversee a portion of the investment portfolio
of a sponsor.1 Such a network brings the potential for interactions between its members, including
competitive pressures that motivate managers within a given sponsor portfolio. Investment consul-
tants, with the power to recommend the hiring or firing of managers, have an incentive to monitor
and discipline the managers they employ. Given that these consultants oversee numerous managers
who provide investment management services for several funds, it is natural to expect that they would
attempt to motivate their managers to gather information from their counterparts.2
While prior research has studied the influence of social networks on investment manager perfor-
mance (e.g., Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008; Coval and Moskowitz, 2001; and Christo↵ersen and
Sarkissian, 2009), all of these papers measure network connections in an indirect way.3 This is not
surprising, as direct connections between fund managers (and between managers and corporate CEOs)
are generally informal and undocumented. And, while investment consultants may keep records on
the network of managers that they use at various funds, they are typically bound by their clients
(the fund sponsors) to keep such data confidential. Indeed, in the US, there is no publicly available
database–even for a fee–that identifies exact linkages between managers and sponsors, as well as the
identity of the overseeing consultant.4
In this paper, we bring much more direct evidence to the question of the importance of man-
ager networks in asset management. Specifically, our paper exploits a unique database that contains
1Delegated asset management, in the U.S., is a sector with over $8 trillion in assets (worldwide, large pools, such as
sovereign wealth funds, add considerably to this figure). Specifically, the combined assets of U.S. defined-benefit pensions
are estimated to be $7.86 trillion, as of Q1 2013 (http://www.pionline.com/article/20130626/ONLINE/130629908/ici-
us-retirement-assets-hit-record-208-trillion). The largest 40 foundations and endowments, as of Q1 2014, held almost
$500 billion in assets (https://www.graypools.com/report/2014/Q1/40-largest-foundations-endowments.html).
2A recent report from the UK’s financial market regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) writes “The
importance of investment consultants as a gateway to the market can be seen by the large proportion of asset managers’
institutional marketing budget which is spent on building relationships with investment consultants. This includes
spending on things like sponsored events and conferences” (Financial Conduct Authority, 2016; Para. 8.70, p. 152).
3For example, Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) measure connectedness through records that indicate that a fund
manager and a corporate executive attended the same university. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) measure connected-
ness through the geographical distance between a manager and a firm. Christo↵ersen and Sarkissian (2009) measure
connectedness using large cities as a proxy.
4For instance, Jenkinson, et al (2016) use survey data to infer how many sponsor clients are served by a particular
manager, since exact relationship data are not available.
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detailed data, both in a large cross-section and in a long time-series, on the connectedness between
defined-benefit pension fund managers – one of the largest groups of delegated portfolio managers.
Our dataset, which covers UK funds, is provided by a one-time granting of proprietary data to allow
academic studies, and o↵ers an unprecedented inside look into the precise network relationships be-
tween investment managers. Our dataset is unique in that it allows us to compute network connections
in a very detailed manner. That is, for each calendar quarter in our sample from 1984-2004, we have
information on the coded identity of each manager employed by each defined-benefit pension fund,
the identity of the overseeing consultant, the return of that manager at that fund, and the sector in
which that manager is expected to invest.5 We use these data to provide evidence on how the network
position of fund managers relates to their investment performance.6
Network connections in our dataset arise from two separate sources. First, in the defined-benefit
pension fund sector, each fund manager oversees only a portion of an overall investment portfolio,
with potentially many other managers overseeing the remainder even within a single asset class (e.g.,
equities). Such overlaps, in turn, create a network of connections across pension fund sponsor/manager
(“fund-manager”) pairings. For example, Manager 1 might manage a portion of the accounts of each
of dozens of pension fund clients, many of whom have also hired Manager 2. This creates a manager-
to-manager connection between managers 1 and 2 (we envision this connection as being facilitated
by the single consultant to each pension fund sponsor).7 As a second source of network connections,
pension funds hire consultants to provide advice on which managers to hire, thus creating a network
between, say, managers 3 and 4, through having a common consultant in their interactions with several
fund sponsors even if the managers do not manage assets for the same pension fund at the same time.
Our unique database allows several new findings. Most importantly, we find that managers that
are better connected (or more central in a network) tend to have higher risk-adjusted returns. We note
that our regressions allow for fund-manager and time fixed-e↵ects. The presence of a fund-manager
5In this paper, we refer to the overall sponsor portfolio as a “pension fund” or simply, “fund,” and the particular
fund within the sponsor portfolio that is overseen by a single manager as a “fund-manager.”Finally, we refer to fund
management companies as managers.
6Our dataset is also employed by Blake et al. (2013), who investigate the e↵ect of the recent decentralization of pension
fund management on investment performance. Here, we focus on the network connections between fund sponsors, fund
managers, and investment consultants. There is a relation between the two papers: as decentralization has increased,
network connections have multiplied. Thus, networks have become more complex and, hence, richer in cross-sectional
variation, which allows us to conduct more powerful tests of the role of connectivity.
7In the pension fund industry, a single pension fund (sponsor) generally retains only one consultant.
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fixed-e↵ect controls for any ability of consultants to identify “good matches” between funds and man-
agers – ensuring that we are not merely capturing that consultants tend to more frequently hire skilled
managers (thus, making them more networked). Instead, the estimated e↵ect of network centrality
comes from time-series variation in the relation between network centrality and risk-adjusted perfor-
mance of a given manager at a given fund.8 The positive relation between risk-adjusted performance
and centrality is also robust to the inclusion of consultant fixed e↵ects – which further ensures that
our findings are not driven by the ability of a subset of consultants to identify (future) successful
fund-manager matchups. When we decompose the network into manager-to-manager and consultant-
to-manager connections, we find that both types of connections appear to be important, with the
latter having a somewhat larger e↵ect. Moreover, our results are not explained simply by more central
managers being bigger, and, thus, more highly connected. In fact, while there is a positive correla-
tion between manager size and centrality, size is negatively related to risk-adjusted performance in our
sample (consistent with Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik, 2004), while centrality is positively related to
risk-adjusted performance. We also find an interaction e↵ect between fund-manager size and network
centrality, which suggests that large funds use their domestic (UK) network centrality to counteract
the negative e↵ect of size on investment performance (i.e., diseconomies-of-scale).9
Second, we find that network connections have a large and significantly positive e↵ect on fund
flows – driven entirely by a manager attracting new pension fund assets rather than attracting more
assets from existing clients – again, after controlling for size. In contrast, fund size has a negative
e↵ect on fund flows, whereas past returns have no e↵ect on flows. This suggests that, controlling for
size and past returns, the more central a manager is, the greater are the expected new-client inflows,
consistent with pension fund sponsors (with the assistance of their consultants) understanding and
endogenizing the value of a manager having a higher network centrality. It may also indicate that
sponsors (and their consultants) use a manager’s centrality in the network to form expectations about
that manager’s future performance, as opposed to only relying on (noisy) past performance.
8Predicting such time variation in skills by a given manager within a given fund is significantly more challenging for
a consultant than simply predicting good performance “on average.”
9Notably, we find little evidence that centrality within our network of UK managers a↵ects the risk-adjusted returns
for international equity managers, consistent with more “localized” benefits associated with network centrality. That is,
the international managers appear to cover very di↵erent non-UK markets, making the information associated with each
manager’s investment strategy of more limited value to other managers.
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Third, we find that managers with high centrality take more risk, consistent with more central
managers having higher levels of private information deriving from their network position, and pension
fund sponsors (and their consultants) tolerating this higher risk-taking because of superior average
performance. To explore possible reasons for this finding, we explore whether network centrality
influences the behavior of managers through the probability that they are fired by their pension fund
clients. We find strong evidence that better connected managers face a significantly reduced probability
of being fired, after controlling for size and past return performance. This finding is consistent with
pension plan sponsors (and their consultants) understanding that more central managers have an
information advantage over less well connected managers.10
To summarize, our results suggest one significant reason why some pension fund managers are
successful, while others are not. Being centrally located in a manager network fosters better risk-
adjusted investment performance, higher inflows, and an ability to reduce both the negative impact
of size that a↵ects most funds as they grow large and the risk of being fired. While we believe that an
“information transmission” mechanism is a plausible explanation for the positive association between
network centrality and future risk-adjusted performance, we do not directly observe information flows,
and an alternative mechanism may also be at work. Specifically, investment consultants may choose
particular fund managers because they like that manager’s investment style and believe it fits well
with a particular sponsor’s overall set of managers. In this case, no information is transmitted from
a manager to another from their connections via a common consultant, but the consultant’s network
connections allow him to better identify fund managers having styles that load on (potentially time-
varying) priced risks that may not be captured by our risk model. Because we do not directly observe
the information flow between fund managers, we cannot rule out such a “priced-risk” mechanism. Nev-
ertheless, we find strong evidence that our findings are not driven by a “reverse causality” mechanism,
whereby skilled investment performance leads to a better network position for the manager.
Other papers in the finance literature have also found that networks can a↵ect investment per-
formance. Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007) examine the e↵ect on venture capital (VC) firm
performance of networks established through syndicated investments, and find that more central VC
10The control for size in this model eliminates the possibility that more networked managers are less likely to be fired
simply because of the market power that might be possessed by large managers over consultants or their sponsors.
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firms experience significantly better fund performance. Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2010) find
that incumbent VCs use their networks to restrict the entry of new (outside) VCs, thereby strength-
ening their bargaining power over entrepreneurs. Ozsoylev, Walden, Yavuz, and Bildik (2014) find
that investors that are central in a network tend to trade earlier and earn higher returns than more
peripheral investors. Pareek (2012) studies the implications of information networks on mutual fund
trading behavior and stock returns, and finds evidence of information linkages between funds with
large positions in the same stocks. Ahern (2013) investigates the relation between network centrality
and the cross-section of stock returns and finds that stocks in industries that are central in networks
of intersectoral trades, on average, earn higher returns than stocks in more peripheral industries.
Buraschi and Porchia (2012) relate networks that connect firms’ fundamentals to the cross-section of
expected returns and find that central firms have higher expected stock returns.11
Our paper contributes to the literature on both networks and delegated portfolio management. Our
data allow a deep analysis of how connections between professional investment managers–through pro-
viding management services for the same fund or through the same investment consultant–contributes
to their success in generating portfolio performance. We show that networks between portfolio man-
agers are a heretofore unexplored and important factor in the delegated portfolio management sector.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces our data and presents empirical evidence on
the networks. Section 3 explores the relation between risk-adjusted return performance and network
centrality, while Section 4 discusses possible interpretations of our findings. Section 5 considers the
dynamic relation between fund flows and network centrality by estimating models that relate fund
flows to past flows, size, return performance, and network centrality. Section 6 considers how funds’
risk-taking behavior is linked to their network centrality and analyzes if centrality a↵ects managers’
incentives through their risk of being fired. Section 7 concludes. Additional results are contained in
appendices at the end of the paper.
11A number of studies present empirical evidence that social networks play an important role in explaining investors’
trading decisions and portfolio returns; see, e.g., Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004), Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2007) and
Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2008, 2010). Stein (2008) develops a model of incentive-compatible information exchange
between competitors bouncing ideas o↵ each other and motivates his theory of word-of-mouth conversations through
professional money manager networks. Equilibrium e↵ects of financial networks are analyzed by Colla and Mele (2010),
Ozsoylev and Walden (2011) and Walden (2015).
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2 Data and networks
This section describes the data on UK pension funds used in our study, and explains the networks
established between funds, managers, and consultants for the most important asset class held by
these funds, UK equities. Next, we describe how we construct the centrality measures used in our
analysis and provide insights into their characteristics, evolution over time, and correlations with other
variables in our dataset.
2.1 Data
Our unique dataset comprises quarterly returns and asset holdings of 2,385 occupational defined benefit
pension plans between March 1984 and March 2004. The data, which were generously provided by
BNY Mellon Asset Servicing, contain information on seven asset classes, but we concentrate on the
biggest one – UK equities – which, on average, comprises about 50% of asset holdings, by market
value, during our sample.12 For each fund, we know the coded identity of the fund manager – or
managers in cases with multiple managers – at each point in time. This is important, since it is
common, especially for large funds, to employ two or more specialized managers, e.g., a large and a
small cap equity manager.
Such overlaps create the potential for network e↵ects, as fund sponsors (on the advice of their
consultants) coordinate the investment decisions across di↵erent managers so as to minimize the
ine ciency loss associated with decentralized decision making (e.g., Sharpe (1981), van Binsbergen
et al. (2008), and Blake et al. (2013)). Funds may also indirectly reveal information about other
managers’ investment strategies by setting up competitions among managers, ensuring that the best-
performing managers see their assets under management increased at the expense of worse-performing
competitors.
12UK equities comprise 50.7%, 57.9%, and 42.7% of asset holdings in 1984, 1994, and 2004, respectively. The other
asset classes are cash, UK bonds, international equities, international bonds, index-linked bonds, and property.
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2.1.1 Managers
Table 1 shows the number of fund-manager pairings – the unit of observation for much of our analysis
– at three points in time (1984, 1994, and 2004).13 The number of fund-manager pairings starts at
1,204, increases to 1,420, then declines to 1,053 by the end of the sample.14 Table 1 also reports the
number of funds in the dataset at the same three points in our sample. Between 1984 and 1994, the
number of UK equity funds increased slightly. The number of funds then decreased between 1994
and 2004. Comparing the number of fund-manager pairings to the number of funds, it is evident
that, over our 20-year sample, a large number of funds moved from being single-managed to being
multi-managed – a change in paradigm analyzed in detail by Blake et al. (2013). For example, the
average number of UK equity managers per fund went from 1.26 in 1984 to 1.67 in 2004.
The remaining columns of Table 1 present the number of managers as well as summary statistics
for the number of connections per manager. The number of UK equity managers in our sample
declined from 113 in 1984 to 82 in 2004. At the same time, the number of network connections
per manager increased over time, indicating that the pension fund management industry became
more concentrated among fewer managers who, in turn, became more inter-connected over time. For
example, the proportion of managers with more than 20 network connections increased from 7% in
1984 to 12% of the managers in 2004.
2.1.2 Consultants
The pension funds in our sample are advised by consultants who play a very significant role in the
appointment of fund managers and the choice of investment mandates, as well as monitoring managers
after they are hired.15 A total of 12 di↵erent consultants performed these services at some point during
our sample period. During our sample, the market for consultants was dominated by four large firms
whose combined market size did not change much. Notably, two consultants – one catering to many
small funds, the other to large funds – merged in 1998. This merger, which we will examine later,
13Each time a manager is given a portion of a pension fund’s assets to manage, a separate account is set up whose
assets and return performance are tracked through time.
14This decrease is the result of sponsors switching from defined-benefit to defined-contribution pension plans.
15As of June 2011, $25 trillion of institutional assets worldwide were advised by investment consultants, and in certain
countries, like the UK, defined-benefit pension fund sponsors are required by law to seek the advice of investment
consultants in their investment decisions.
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increased the scope of advisory services (i.e., both large fund and small fund consulting services under
one umbrella) for the merged consultant entity, with little overlap.
2.2 Network relations
A network is characterized by its nodes (agents) and edges (connections). To construct networks, we
include all agents (funds, fund managers and consultants) present at a given point in time. This allows
us to construct a time series of network connections.
To illustrate how our network of funds, managers, and consultants are structured, Figure 1 shows
a simple example comprising five pension funds, two consultants and five managers. Fund 1 is advised
by Consultant 1 and employs Manager 1; Fund 2 is advised by Consultant 1 and employs managers
1 and 2; Fund 3 is advised by Consultant 1 and employs managers 2 and 4; Fund 4 is advised by
Consultant 2 and employs managers 2, 3, and 4; finally, Fund 5 is advised by Consultant 2 and employs
managers 4 and 5.
The top panel in the figure displays the full set of connections between pension funds, managers,
and consultants–the so-called extended-form representation of the network. For each fund-manager
connection, square boxes show the size of the associated account. Using this information, the bottom
panel displays only the connections between managers and consultants–the so-called reduced-form
representation–with green lines representing consultant-manager connections, and blue lines repre-
senting manager-manager connections arising when multiple managers co-manage the same fund.
Managers 2 and 4 are seen to be particularly central in the network as they each manage accounts for
three funds.
Having illustrated with the simple example in Figure 1 how the (reduced form) networks are
formed, Figure 2 uses the full set of connections in our data set to form networks at three points in
time during our sample, namely 1984, 1994, and 2004, for the UK equities asset class. Nodes shown as
red circles represent individual managers, while the black diamonds in the horizontal row represent the
12 consultants.16 Next to each node is the code of the manager or consultant. This code is specific to
individual managers and consultants, and remains constant throughout the sample. Managers whose
16Note that some consultants may have very few (or even zero) connections in a given asset class and at a given point
in time.
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nodes are shown above the consultants are only connected to other managers through consultants (i.e.,
they did not co-manage a pension fund at that point in time), while managers whose nodes fall below
the consultants are connected with at least one other manager though a contemporaneous presence
in a pension fund. Blue lines in Figure 2 track network connections between managers (established
through managers’ sharing of the same pension fund client, and, thus, being linked through that fund’s
consultant) while green lines track connections between consultants and managers.17
2.3 Measuring network centrality
Network centrality can be measured in a variety of ways that are designed to capture di↵erent dimen-
sions of the network. Because of such di↵erences, and to ensure robustness of our empirical results,
we consider three centrality measures, namely degree centrality, value-weighted prestige centrality
and betweenness centrality. Degree centrality captures direct connections between nodes, but does
not weight individual connections by their importance nor does it consider how well-connected these
connections are, in turn. Value-weighted prestige centrality overcomes the first limitation of degree
centrality by assigning di↵erent weights to direct connections, while betweenness accounts for the ex-
tent to which a node is a “hub” that serves to connect other nodes. We briefly introduce these three
centrality measures in more detail.18
Our first measure of network centrality, degree centrality, measures the number of neighbors a
node has, relative to the total number of nodes. For a specific network node–i.e., a manager or a
consultant–this measure can be interpreted as the immediate probability that the node “catches”
information flowing through the network. Formally, the degree centrality of node j at time t, DEjt,
is defined as:
DEjt =
djt
Nt   1 , (1)
where djt is the number of connected neighbors for node j at time t and Nt is the total number of
nodes in the network at time t.
17In 1994, 9 of the 12 consultants have multiple connections, while, in 2004, this number decreased to 7, showing
the consolidation that took place in the consulting industry over the 20-year sample period. Some consultants have no
connections to managers; they are shown, however, because they did have connections at a di↵erent point-in-time during
our sample.
18See Billio et al. (2012) for a thorough discussion of the estimation of di↵erent network measures.
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The second measure of centrality, value-weighted prestige centrality, is similar in spirit to degree
centrality, but incorporates the idea that certain connections are more important than others. In our
setting, the weight of each network connection is determined by the assets under management (AUM)
that the manager manages through the recommendation of the consultant (summed across funds)
or by the total sum of the assets under management when computing manager-to-manager network
connections. Specifically, the value-weighted prestige centrality of node j at time t, Pjt, is defined as:
Pjt =
X
i 6=j
gjit
Pit
dit
(2)
where gjit is the (j, i) entry of the weighted connection matrix at time t; i, j refer to managers or
consultants; and dit is, again, the number of connected neighbors of node i at time t.19
Finally, betweenness centrality measures how many shortest paths connecting di↵erent nodes go
through a particular node (manager or consultant). Hence it captures how important a node is in
connecting other nodes. The betweenness of node j at time t, BEjt, is thus defined as:
BEjt =
P
k 6=i;j 6=k;j 6=i
Pj(k,i)
P (k,i)
(Nt   1)(Nt   2)/2 , (3)
where Pj(k, i) is the number of shortest paths between k and i that pass through j, and P (k, i) is the
number of shortest paths between k and i.
As a concrete example of how the three centrality measures are computed, the table at the bottom
of Figure 1 reports values for these measures using the data from the graphs in the figure. For example,
a very small degree centrality of 2/6 is assigned to Manager 1, who is only connected to Manager 2
and Consultant 1 through Fund 1 and Fund 2. In contrast, Manager 2 is connected to managers 1,
3 and 4, and also to consultants 1 and and 2 (through funds 2, 3 and 4) and, therefore, has a very
high degree centrality of 5/6. Turning to the value-weighted prestige centrality, we see that this can
be quite di↵erent from degree centrality. For example, although managers 2 and 4 have identical
degree centrality for our example, Manager 2 obtains a higher value-weighted prestige centrality than
Manager 4 due to the slightly larger accounts handled by Manager 2. Finally, we see that some
19The definition reported in Equation (2) is self-referential. See Chapter 2 in Jackson (2008) for details on how to
solve for Pjt.
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managers that are peripheral in the network–notably managers 1, 3 and 5–get a betweenness measure
of zero, meaning that no shortest path passes through these managers. In contrast, Manager 2 has
the highest betweenness measure, because it is on the shortest path between other managers and
consultants.20
Returning to our UK pension fund data, Figure 3 plots the distribution of centrality measures at
three points in time. Note that the distribution of value-weighted prestige centrality is considerably
more concentrated at small values than degree centrality, which is more spread out. The dispersion
in betweenness centrality falls between the other two measures. These di↵erences reflect that degree
centrality is an unweighted measure of connectedness, unlike the other two. In addition to such di↵er-
ences across centrality measures, we also observe considerable variation over time for each centrality
measure. As we shall see, such time variation in network centrality is informative in helping us to
identify the e↵ect of network centrality on performance.
2.4 Evolution of the networks
Figures 2 and 3 suggest that the number of network connections has changed substantially over
time. To gain a better sense of how the “average” centrality measure has evolved during our sample,
we next study the time-series of the average centrality measures. Each calendar quarter we first
standardize every centrality measure by subtracting its time-series average and standard deviation
over the full sample, so as to create a measure with mean zero and unit variance. Specifically, let
NETt = M
 1
t
PMt
j=1NETjt be the cross-sectional average centrality measure at the beginning of
quarter t, averaged across the Mt managers in existence, while MEAN(NETt) and STDEV (NETt)
are time-series statistics of NETt computed over the sample 1984-2004. The standardized centrality
measure is then constructed as follows:
S NETt =
NETt  MEAN(NETt)
STDEV (NETt)
. (4)
Figure 4 plots the time series of the normalized centrality measures, S NETt, over our sample
20Note that, even in this very simple case, the computation of betweenness centrality for a given node is quite complex
as it requires considering the 21 total possible connections between each node in the network, i.e., Consultant 1 and
Consultant 2, Consultant 1 and Manager 1, Consultant 1 and Manager 2, etc.
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period. For all three centrality measures, we see a distinct upward trend between 1991 and 1998,
interrupted by a merger-related drop in October 1998, a consolidation to 2002, and a large increase
starting in 2003. Figure 4 indicates that the three centrality measures share a common trend compo-
nent, but also that each measure of centrality captures somewhat di↵erent short-run information.
Panel B in Table 1 uses correlations to summarize the relation between our three network measures,
as well as their correlation with fund-manager size and manager size. The three network measures
are strongly, but not perfectly correlated, with average correlations around 0.90. In turn, the three
centrality measures are virtually uncorrelated with fund-manager size, but have a positive correlation
(0.61-0.66) with manager size (total management company UK equity AUM in our dataset). We would
expect larger managers to have more network connections, but the results here suggest that manager
size only accounts for a modest proportion of the variation in network centrality, raising the prospects
that we can identify the separate e↵ect of network centrality and size on a given manager’s investment
performance. We address this question in the next section.
3 Return performance and network centrality
This section addresses how the location of fund managers in a network influences their investment
performance. We first explain how we construct a measure of the dependent variable (risk-adjusted
returns), then present results from panel regressions that use centrality as a covariate, while controlling
for fund-manager and time fixed e↵ects, as well as fund and fund-manager size.
3.1 Risk-adjusted returns and network centrality
To explore the relation between risk-adjusted returns and network centrality, we first construct an
estimate of risk-adjusted returns. Specifically, for each fund-manager pairing, we compute quarterly
UK equity returns net of a three-month risk-free rate, rijt. Here, the subscript i refers to the fund,
while j refers to the manager and t refers to the calendar quarter. We next regress this on the excess
returns on the UK stock market index, rmkt,t, returns on a UK size factor, SMBt, a UK value-growth
12
factor, HMLt and a UK momentum factor, MOMt:21
rijt = ↵ij +  1ijrmkt,t +  2ijSMBt +  3ijHMLt +  4ijMOMt + "ijt. (5)
Fund-manager pairings that survive for less than 12 quarterly observations are dropped as they would
result in insu ciently precise estimates. Using the resulting estimates, for each fund-manager and
each quarter, we compute the associated risk-adjusted returns, bradjijt = b↵ij + b"ijt.
Using our estimates of risk-adjusted performance from Equation (5) as the dependent variable,
we perform panel regressions that include both fund-manager and time fixed-e↵ects, that control for
fund-manager and manager size, and that use standard errors that are clustered at the fund-manager
level. To control for size e↵ects on performance, we include terms that control for both fund-level
and management company-level scale economies (or diseconomies). First, we compute the size for
each fund-manager pairing, SIZEijt, measured as the market value of UK equity assets controlled
by management company j for fund i at the beginning of quarter t. Second, for each management
company, we compute the UK equity assets under management across all funds managed at the
beginning of quarter t, labeled M SIZEjt =
PManjt
i=1 SIZEijt, by summing manager j’s funds across
all (UK equity) mandates, Manjt. Each quarter, we convert these to relative size measures by taking
the log of the size variable divided by its cross-sectional average, e.g., log(M SIZEjt/M SIZEt),
whereM SIZEt =M
 1
t
PMt
j=1M SIZEjt is the cross-sectional average manager size, averaged across
the number of managers in existence at time t, Mt. This normalization helps to control for any
time-varying industry-level diseconomies-of-scale, as documented by Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor
(2015).22
Since we wish our panel regressions to test for the e↵ect of network centrality on performance,
unless otherwise noted, we normalize each of the network centrality measures for manager j by scaling
it by the cross-sectional average, i.e., NETjt/NETt, thus accounting for time-series trends in the
overall network structure which might otherwise a↵ect our econometric estimates. Centrality is always
21We use the FTSE All-Share Total Return Index as the UK stock market portfolio, rmkt,t. The factors SMBt, HMLt,
and MOMt are UK versions of the factors commonly used for US equities. They are supplied by Professor Alan Gregory
of Exeter University (http://xfi.exeter.ac.uk/researchandpublications/ portfoliosandfactors/index.php).
22We note that industry-level diseconomies, due to the significant size of the UK pension fund industry relative to UK
equity markets, are captured separately through the quarterly time dummies.
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measured ex-ante, i.e., prior to the return measurement quarter. It is also likely that any advantages
conferred by a high level of network centrality are better exploited by larger management companies.
To capture possible scale e↵ects of network centrality, we add an interaction term between network
centrality and manager size, NETjt ⇥M SIZEjt. To ease the comparison of estimated coe cients,
we standardize all regressors so that they each have unit variance.
Table 2 presents results from panel regressions of the form
bradjijt = aij + bt +  1SIZEijt +  2M SIZEjt +  3NETjt +  4NETjt ⇥M SIZEjt + "ijt. (6)
This regression allows us to study the e↵ect of network centrality, NETjt, while controlling for varia-
tions in fund-manager size or management company size, and allowing for fund-manager and time fixed
e↵ects. Thus, we use variation over time in network centrality for a given fund-manager combination
to identify its e↵ect on risk-adjusted performance. We show results without and with the network-
size interaction term NET ⇥M SIZE in odd and even columns, respectively. Panel A uses degree
centrality, Panel B uses value-weighted prestige centrality, and Panel C uses betweenness centrality.
First, consider the e↵ect of size on risk-adjusted performance, across regression specifications,
as shown in the first two rows of Table 2. Across all model specifications, fund-manager and total
management company size negatively predict performance–consistent with past literature.23 Moreover,
the negative e↵ect of manager size on performance is largest and always highly statistically significant.
This suggests that any diseconomies of scale are determined by the size of the manager, rather than by
the size of the account, which makes sense since a management company can be expected to employ
similar strategies across its di↵erent fund accounts.
Turning to the relation between network centrality and performance, the estimates reported in
row three show (for models without an interaction e↵ect) that there is a strongly positive e↵ect of
centrality on risk-adjusted performance. The coe cient is economically and statistically significant – a
23Notably, Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004), find negative economies at the fund level but positive economies
at the management company level for the U.S. mutual fund industry. Our finding of diseconomies-of-scale at the
management company level is likely due to the fact that pension fund management companies comprise a much larger
fraction of the total market capitalization in the UK, relative to mutual funds in the U.S. Large management companies
in the UK, therefore, face di culties in trading their positions that outweigh other advantages of being large (such as
being able to cross trades within the company or share a large pool of analysts).
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one standard deviation increase in network centrality (controlling for size of mandate and management
company) raises the expected risk-adjusted return by between 0.20% and 0.31% per annum. This
finding holds across the three di↵erent centrality measures (Panels A-C), and irrespective of whether
we include consultant fixed e↵ects.
The direct e↵ect of a one standard deviation increase in centrality (20-30 bps per annum, depending
on the specification) may seem relatively modest. However, our estimate of the e↵ect of centrality on
fund performance is comparable to that found for many other fund characteristics by Ferreira et al
(2013). Specifically, analyzing a large set of non-US funds,24 Ferreira et al. (2013) find that a one
standard deviation change in fund size, fund family size or fund age is associated with improvements
in future performance of 44, 32, and 24 basis points per year, respectively.
Finally, in row four we find a strongly positive e↵ect from including a centrality/management com-
pany size interaction term. The significance of the interaction term confirms that the performance of
large managers is more sensitive to network centrality than that of small managers, which also implies
that a central position in the network helps management companies cushion the otherwise strongly
negative e↵ect of their aggregated assets (under management) on performance. This interaction e↵ect
is so important that NET , by itself, now becomes insignificant – well-connected small management
companies are less able to exploit their centrality.
3.1.1 Combined e↵ect of manager size and centrality on performance
Table 2 reveals a significant but opposing impact on risk-adjusted returns coming from the size vari-
ables, M SIZE and SIZE, and the centrality variables, NET . For example, the results in the second
column of Panel A in Table 2 show that the coe cients on SIZE and M SIZE are negative (-0.292
and -0.722, respectively) while the coe cients on NET and NET ⇥M SIZE are positive (0.042 and
0.365, respectively).
We illustrate the combined e↵ect of size and centrality through a simple exercise that computes
the combined (marginal) e↵ect of the size and centrality variables on performance. We focus on large
funds and managers as captured by the 75-th, 90-th, and 95-th percentiles of the size distributions.
24 Ferreira et al. (2013) do not single out these results by country, so non-US funds is as close as we can get to UK
funds.
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For example, denote the 75-th percentile of SIZE andM SIZE as SIZE 75 andM SIZE 75. From
Panel A in Table 2, the combined e↵ect of size and centrality on fund performance is
Combined Effect =  0.292 SIZE 75  0.722 M SIZE 75 + 0.042 NET
+ 0.365 NET ⇥M SIZE 75, (7)
where we let NET range over its full support, i.e., from 0.07 to 4.08.
Figure 5 shows that, even for very large managers and funds (the 95-th percentiles of the size
distributions), the joint e↵ect of size and centrality is positive, as long as the centrality measure is
greater than 2.5 (red line). This centrality value is relatively small, if we consider that large fund
managers tend to have large centrality measures. In fact, 2.5 corresponds to the 75-th percentile
for the NET degree centrality distribution in UK equities. Note also that, in all cases (all three
lines), increasing centrality is associated with an increasing risk-adjusted return–illustrating that the
“Combined Effect” always results in a positive first-order condition with respect to centrality.25
3.1.2 Decomposing the e↵ect of network centrality
The network centrality measures used so far combine manager-to-manager and consultant-to-manager
connections. In an e↵ort to understand whether the superior performance of well-connected man-
agers emerges from their manager-to-manager connections, their consultant-to-manager connections,
or both, we focus on degree centrality and – for each manager and each time period – we construct sep-
arate centrality measures using either manager connections or consultant connections, but not both.
We then re-estimate panel regression (6), including manager-to-manager (DEG M) and consultant-to-
manager (DEG C) degree centrality. As expected, the two measures are closely correlated, but their
correlation is low enough (0.82) that we can estimate their separate e↵ects on investment performance.
The results, reported in appendix Table A2, show that both types of centrality measures are related
to investment performance. The coe cients are economically similar, but the consultant-to-manager
centrality measure tends to have a slightly larger and more significant e↵ect on investment perfor-
25To shed further light on the relation between fund-manager size and centrality, Appendix A conducts a panel Granger
causality analysis. We find that centrality predicts future size whereas a manager’s size fails to predict future centrality.
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mance than the manager-to-manager centrality measure. Both types of network connections–through
managers or through consultants–thus appear to be important in explaining the better investment
performance of more central managers, with the latter type of network connection being slightly more
important overall.
These findings are consistent with a mosaic theory of information acquisition, see Solomon and
Soltes (2015). According to this view, consultants act as conduits for the di↵usion of information while
managers are able to collect information through their network connections and skillfully process this
information in a way that leads to improved investment performance. Exploiting the information
flowing through the network to improve investment performance may require combining such informa-
tion with managers’ other information sources and may also require managers’ information processing
skills. The central role played by consultants in the network therefore does not imply that consultants
should be able to systematically pick successful managers – a point we discuss in Section 4.4.
4 Possible explanations for network e↵ects
Section 3 established that network centrality matters for investment performance. We now explore
potential mechanisms for this e↵ect. First, to address whether managers gather information from their
network, we decompose total fund returns into returns from systematic risk factors versus idiosyncratic
returns, then analyze whether connected funds pursue more “similar” investment strategies than non-
connected ones. Second, we shed further light on how network centrality may benefit investment
performance by briefly considering its e↵ect on performance in international equities.
This section also addresses the potential for “reverse causality” (performance leading to network
centrality) in two ways. First, we use the merger between two consultants in our sample to perform
a di↵erence-in-di↵erence analysis that explores how risk-adjusted performance changes after this ex-
ogenous shock to network centrality of some fund managers, relative to those not experiencing the
shock. Second, because networks are endogenously formed, they could potentially be the result of
a consultant’s prediction of the future performance of a given manager at a given pension fund. If
performance causes network centrality, we would expect that consultants should be able to identify
the best performing fund managers. We, therefore, test whether consultants are systematically able
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to select successful managers.
Finally, we consider an alternative explanation for the impact of network centrality on performance,
namely the possibility that network centrality matters to investment performance through managers’
choice of investment style which could either attract or be influenced by the consultant.
4.1 Correlation between connected and non-connected managers
To further understand how network connections a↵ect fund returns and performance, we next ask if
we can detect similarities in investment strategies for managers that share one or more network con-
nections. We measure performance using three di↵erent estimates of returns, namely, total, systematic
(factor-induced), and abnormal (residual) returns (these return components are computed using Equa-
tion (5).) We proceed by, first, aggregating returns at the manager level by value-weighting returns
across all funds managed by a given manager. We then compute return correlations for all possible
pairings of managers in the dataset, subject to the manager pairings overlapping for at least 12 quar-
ters, to obtain a reliable estimate of manager-to-manager correlations. Third, for each manager, we
separately average the return correlations for that manager (i) with managers that are connected with
that manager, and (ii) with managers that are not. Fourth, we compute the median of the average
correlations across all connected and non-connected managers in the dataset. Fifth, and finally, we
evaluate the di↵erences in medians across the two sets of correlations using two-sided permutation
tests with 1,000 iterations.
Table 3 reports the outcome of this analysis. The median correlations between total returns (first
row) are very similar for connected managers, compared to non-connected managers. Specifically,
the return correlation among connected managers is 95.4%, compared to 94.9% among non-connected
managers and these correlations are not statistically di↵erent from each other. Of course, these high
values may simply reflect the importance of common factors in explaining return performance, and not
a tendency for certain managers to invest similarly. Therefore, we next explore, separately, systematic
and idiosyncratic return correlations between managers.
Using the systematic return component, the second row shows that the median correlations com-
puted across connected and non-connected managers are essentially identical. This result indicates
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that there is no di↵erence in systematic risk-taking between connected and non-connected managers.
In sharp contrast, the third row reveals much greater di↵erences in residual return correlations
among connected and non-connected managers. Specifically, the median residual return correlation
among connected managers is 17.0% versus 9.6% among non-connected managers. This di↵erence in
residual return correlations is statistically and economically significant. These findings are consistent
with network positions a↵ecting fund managers’ security and sector selection strategies.
4.2 Network centrality and performance in international equities
Our main analysis focuses on the funds’ UK equity holdings. However, as mentioned earlier, the
pension funds in our sample hold investments in other asset classes, including international equities.
UK pension funds are a much smaller fraction of the overall market in international markets than in
domestic asset markets. As a consequence, a manager with a central position in the domestic equity
market observes the preferred investment strategies of a large part of the market and should be better
able to infer the resulting asset market equilibrium and possibly take advantage of this information,
compared to the same manager in international stock markets.
To measure risk-adjusted performance, for international equities, we use a four-factor model that
includes sterling-denominated excess returns on the MSCI North American (NA) and Europe Australa-
sia Far Eastern ex-UK (EAFEX) Total Return Indices, as well as global size (SMB) and value-growth
(HML) factors, all obtained from MSCI Barra:26
rijt = ↵ij +  1ijNAt +  2ijEAFEXt +  3ijSMBt +  4ijHMLt + "ijt. (8)
For both the degree and betweenness centrality measures we find little evidence that network
centrality a↵ects investment performance in international equities, suggesting that the benefits from
network centrality are limited to the domestic market in which the fund managers are major actors.27
26We include a North American market return factor separately due to the evidence in Timmermann and Blake
(2005) that UK pension funds considerably overweighted this market in their international equity portfolio. We also
experimented with versions of this model that add a momentum factor and found that this makes little di↵erence to the
results.
27Further supporting the evidence from this subsection, Appendix B provides results on the performance-centrality
relation which control for centrality in other asset classes. We find that it is the network centrality within an asset class
that matters to the performance-centrality relation.
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4.3 The merger of two consultants: A natural experiment
The results presented so far indicate a positive relation between managers’ network centrality and
their ability to outperform. A potential concern with the results is that of reverse-causality: being
well-connected can improve managers’ risk-adjusted performance due to the resulting informational
advantages, but an alternative explanation is that managers could be centrally placed in the network
because they possess skills. Under this alternative mechanism, network centrality is the result of
managers’ skills, and not vice-versa.
To test the plausibility of this reverse-causality hypothesis, we use an exogenous shock in the
network structure of the UK pension fund industry. On October 1, 1998, it was announced that two
consultants (William M. Mercer and Sedgwick Noble Lowndes, consultants 2 and 11 in our data set)
were merging. Mercer served mainly large clients, while Sedgwick Noble Lowndes served mainly small
clients, so the merger was based on business synergies unrelated to any perceived future changes in
the abilities of the two consultants to choose skilled managers.
Accordingly, this merger provides an exogenous shock to the centrality of those managers that
were associated with the merged consultants. Before the merger, consultant no. 2 (Mercer) managed
202 mandates, while consultant no. 11 (Sedgwick) managed 213 mandates. After the merger, the
number of joint mandates (two managers that manage assets at the same pension fund) jumped to
405. Some managers who, prior to the merger, were connected to either of the two a↵ected consultants
experienced an increase to their network centrality, while others saw it decline. We use the merger
event to identify the e↵ect of network centrality on investment performance.
Our analysis adopts a simple di↵-in-di↵ approach that modifies the baseline specification in Equa-
tion (6) to include a treatment dummy interacted with the NET measure of centrality for all those
managers connected to Consultant 2 (the surviving merged consultant) after 1998, the date of the
merger. Specifically, we estimate for fund i, manager j, and time t:
bradjijt = aij + bt +  1SIZEijt +  2M SIZEjt +  3NETjt +  4NETjt ⇥M Dummyjt + "ijt.
The merger treatment dummy M Dummyjt is switched on for three years after the merger for all
managers involved in the merger. We choose a three-year window to allow the additional connections
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to have an impact on the managers’ performance, but the results are robust – in fact, even stronger
– when we use four- and five-year windows.28
The results, reported in Table 4, show that the interaction between the treatment dummy and
centrality has a positive coe cient ranging from 0.074 for the betweenness measure to 0.153 for degree
centrality. Moreover, for all three centrality measures the interaction term is statistically significant
at the 10% level with the strongest result emerging for degree centrality, which generates a p-value of
0.02. These results indicate a significant and positive relation between being exogenously exposed to
a shock to network centrality and subsequent risk-adjusted performance.29
4.4 Can investment consultants pick winners?
The above tests provide evidence that network centrality leads to superior performance, due to cen-
trally located managers being better-positioned to receive information on the strategies of their com-
petitors. As a final robustness check of this hypothesis vs. the reverse (managers are central because
they are skilled), we test whether any of the consultants are systematically able to select successful
fund managers. Consultants are the most well-informed entities in the UK pension fund industry, as
they are able to closely observe the strategies of the majority of fund managers – which is why they
are trusted in advising fund sponsors in their hiring and firing decisions. We conjecture that, if it is
possible to identify successful managers in the industry, the consultants should be best-positioned to
successfully perform this task. If consultants have the ability to predict which managers will outper-
form in the future, then they may place such superior managers in a larger network – even before they
realize superior performance. Network centrality might, therefore, lead subsequent performance even
though the direction of causality could be the reverse.
At the heart of this reverse causality mechanism lies the hypothesis that consultants can pick
winners. To test this hypothesis, we estimate consultant fixed-e↵ects in the regressions for risk-
28Our observations are fund-manager pairings, so these results are not due to managers perceived to be skilled being
awarded more business by the merged consultant after the merger.
29As an additional robustness exercise, we also conducted a more refined analysis, which accounts for how individual
managers’ centrality was a↵ected by the merger. We compute – for each manager – the change in the manager’s centrality
measures and assign the value 1 to the merger treatment dummy only for those managers that (i) are involved in the
merger and (ii) whose (relative) centrality increases as a result of the merger. We find that the interaction between the
treatment dummy and centrality has a positive and statistically significant coe cient close to 0.2 for two of the three
centrality measures (degree and value-weighted prestige). For the third centrality measure (betweenness) the coe cient
is positive, but small and insignificant.
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adjusted performance. These fixed e↵ects pool information across funds that are advised by the same
consultant. Specifically, we adopt the specification,
rict = k + ↵c +  1icrmkt,t +  2icSMBt +  3icHMLt +  4icMOMt + ✏ict. (9)
In this regression, i refers to the fund, c refers to the consultant, and t refers to the time period.
Notice that we allow for consultant-fund di↵erences by allowing the betas to di↵er across consultant-
fund pairings.30 This is an important consideration, since consultants often operate under di↵erent
mandates for di↵erent funds. The estimated annualized alphas for the individual consultants are
reported in Table 5. None of the consultants have alphas that are di↵erent from zero at the 95%
confidence level (using a two-tailed t-test), suggesting that consultants are not systematically able to
pick superior fund managers, a result consistent with the findings in Jenkinson et al. (2016).
To summarize, these results suggest that it is unlikely that managers are central in the network
solely because they are skilled, and suggest that network centrality, in itself, o↵ers certain advantages.
Another consideration that renders reverse-causality less plausible is that regression (6) allows for fund-
manager and time fixed-e↵ects. The presence of a fund-manager fixed-e↵ect means that we already
account for the ability of consultants to identify “good matches” between funds and managers. Instead,
the estimated e↵ect of network centrality in (6) comes from time-series variation in the relation between
network centrality and risk-adjusted performance.
4.5 Choice of investment style
We believe that the most plausible explanation for our findings is the following. First, a more central
network position places a manager in an advantageous position to receive and process information.
Specifically, such a central network position makes it easier for a manager to gather information and
to observe his competitors’ actions, including discovering which investment strategies work, and which
do not.31 We have shown evidence supportive of this view, including that managers tend to converge
30In these models, standard errors are clustered at the consultant-fund level.
31For instance, at the Q-Group (www.q-group.org), a large audience of well-networked fund managers interacts with
a large number of fund sponsors. This interaction includes the presentation of investment strategies developed in-
house (by a manager), as well as private face-to-face meetings between managers and sponsors. Managers that are
more networked, i.e., work for more sponsors, are more likely to be invited to become members and to speak at such
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toward each other’s strategies (as measured by the correlation in their idiosyncratic risk), as well as
evidence from a natural experiment showing that a merger between consultants changes individual
managers’ network centrality in a way that is positively correlated with investment performance.
However, for completeness, we note that we do not observe direct proxies for the flow of information
in networks; we observe only the evolution of the structure of the network over time, and how it a↵ects
a given fund-manager relation. Accordingly, we note that an alternative explanation is that network
centrality matters because of a manager’s choice of investment style, which could either attract or
be influenced by the consultant. For example, a manager may be selected by a consultant (perhaps
acting on behalf of fund trustees), because the consultant likes the manager’s investment style (say,
a quantitative selection technique for equities). Alternatively, given its overview of the competitive
landscape at a given point in time, a consultant may hire a manager and incentivize him to adopt the
investment style of other managers – either by shifting loadings on existing risk factors or by loading
onto new ones.32
While we cannot detect all shifts in exposure to omitted risk factors that might result from increased
network centrality, we can explore whether there is evidence that variation in network centrality leads
to time variation in funds’ exposure to known risk factors. To do this, we, first, use a 12-quarter
rolling window to estimate loadings on the market, SMB, HML, and MOM risk factors for manager
j in fund i at time t. We then compute the quarterly time-series variation in the exposure of each
fund-manager pairing to each risk factor as follows:
  Factor,ijt = ( Factor,ijt    Factor,ijt 1)⇥ 12. (10)
Finally, we estimate – for each risk factor – the following panel regression:
  Factor,ijt = ai,j + bt +  1SIZEijt +  2M SIZEjt +  3NETjt + "ijt, (11)
professional conferences, since sponsors wish to know about, and to compare with, the strategies used by their colleagues.
32Investment consultants’ ratings of fund managers provide another channel through which managers’ choice of invest-
ment style may be correlated. Consultants’ ratings are formed from a combination of quantitative (past performance)
and qualitative (quality and stability of team, investment styles, philosophy, capacity for innovative ideas) measures.
Through their monitoring e↵orts, investment consultant gain private information on each manager’s strategy. These
strategies across fund managers hired on the basis of the recommendations of the same consultant are likely to be
correlated since the same measures score highly in the consultant-specific rating.
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where SIZEijt denotes the assets under management of each fund-manager pairing, M SIZEjt de-
notes the manager’s assets under management in UK equities, cumulated across all funds managed,
and NETjt denotes the manager’s network centrality. All variables have been transformed and stan-
dardized as previously described and all specifications use fund-manager and time fixed e↵ects.
The results, reported in Table 6, suggest that, the more central a manager becomes, the more he
focuses on small-capitalization stocks and value stocks. These are the types of stocks that are harder
to value, and for which private information may be particularly advantageous. Conversely, managers
focus less on momentum stocks as they become more central. This is true for degree centrality and
betweenness centrality, whereas prestige centrality exhibits insignificance in this dimension. These
findings are consistent with network centrality being related to managers’ choice of investment style.
We also note that our original mechanism may be consistent with consultants as “gatekeepers,”
who randomly (or in exchange for some benefit) hire managers. In this mechanism, the managers
who (somewhat by luck) are hired by a consultant see their network connections increase, and exploit
this increased centrality to improve their strategies and performance. Consultants do not appear to
be responsible for this, because many of their manager choices underperform (i.e., highly networked
small fund managers). Thus, one must conduct the conditional regressions that we do in this paper,
where we consider interactive e↵ects of fund characteristics (i.e., size) and network centrality to detect
the e↵ect of centrality on manager skill-building.
Variants to these two mechanisms are also plausible. It is possible that a consultant hires a manager
because the investment style of that manager fits well with other managers within a given pension
fund, but that the manager improves her application of the style by learning from other managers
with whom she has become networked and starts generating alpha from the strategy.
Finally, we must allow that there are other possible omitted variables that are correlated with
network centrality. Among these could be scope e ciencies gained in trading when a manager serves
many pension funds (cross-trading, for example); scope e ciencies gained by serving a larger pool of
pension funds, each of which has their own idiosyncratic investment constraints and/or governance
quality (e.g., trustees are either inattentive or very active and smart); and diversification in flow-related
trading. We cannot rule out these alternative mechanisms in favor of the “information dissemination”
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mechanism, although our evidence seems more supportive of the latter.33
5 Fund flows and network centrality
We next address whether managers’ centrality in the network a↵ects flows of money into the funds
they manage. We consider the results at the manager, rather than the fund-manager level, since
defined-benefit flows for managers mainly occur through being hired (or fired) to manage additional
(fewer) funds.
We split the analysis by considering inflows from existing mandates separately from inflows from
new mandates. This distinction plays an important role for our sample of defined-benefit pension
schemes. For existing mandates, high past returns may actually result in smaller inflows, as the
sponsor rebalances toward a target allocation for the manager. This is a unique feature of our data
that contrasts starkly with mutual funds, for which higher past performance tends to lead to stronger
inflows. In our setting of defined-benefit pension plans, high network centrality is more likely to allow
managers to grow assets through new clients, rather than existing ones.
For existing mandates, we generate our fund-flow variable for manager j over the course of quarter
t as follows:
Flowjt+1 =
✓
M SIZEjt+1  M SIZEjt
M SIZEjt
 Rjt:t+1
◆
M SIZEjt, (12)
where M SIZEjt and M SIZEjt+1 are the starting market values (of existing mandates) of manager
j’s asset holdings at quarter t and t+ 1 and Rjt:t+1 is the return generated over quarter t. For newly
assigned mandates, the fund-flow variable for manager j over quarter t is the value of the newly
assigned mandates.
Note that we analyze the level of flows rather than percentage flows (which are often used in
studying flows to mutual funds). We believe that flow levels are more appropriate as the explained
variable in our setting, as flows from sponsors are naturally capped by the dollar value of their aggregate
(projected) liabilities. In addition, targets on asset allocation (which are commonly set by sponsors
on the advice of consultants) means that an increased allocation of money to one manager comes
33For example, it is not clear, if more networked funds benefit from diversification in flow-related trading, why an
increase in network centrality does not benefit smaller funds.
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from a decreased allocation of the same amount of money from another manager. Moreover, fund size
matters for a manager’s ability to execute some types of investment strategies and this information is
lost if we study percentage flows for small and large funds alike.
We regress the manager flow variable on lagged flow, network centrality, NET , and manager
size, M SIZE. We also include Past Risk Adj Ret, constructed by value-weighting the risk-adjusted
returns across the various funds managed over the previous year. Finally, the regression includes time
and manager fixed e↵ects:
Flowjt+1 = aj + ct +  1NETjt +  2Flowjt +  3M SIZEjt
+  4Past Risk Adj Retjt + "jt+1. (13)
The results for newly assigned mandates are reported in Panel A of Table 7. Our estimates show
that network centrality is positively and significantly related to flows, and that this finding is robust
with regard to which of the three centrality measures is used. As for the remaining coe cients,
manager size is negatively and significantly related to flows, although its coe cient is only significant
in the regression that uses degree centrality.34 Past risk-adjusted performance is not a significant
predictor of future flows while lagged flows are borderline significant at the 10% level with a positive
coe cient. Thus, pension funds highly value networked managers when allocating their money–even
more so than noisier measures of manager skill, such as past performance and lagged flows.
Turning to the flows for existing mandates (Panel B), the centrality coe cient NET is now in-
significant for all three centrality measures, indicating that more central connected managers do not
attract more flows from existing mandates because of their network position. This finding is consistent
with our earlier observation that flows to existing accounts in defined-benefit pension plans cannot be
expected to be very sensitive to forecasts of future performance. For existing mandates, we continue
to find that past risk-adjusted performance is insignificantly related to flows, whereas the evidence
that lagged flows predict future flows is stronger for mandates that are already in place.
Taken together, the results reported in this section show that network centrality does not seem to
34Note that this is strong evidence that sponsors (and their consultants) are keenly aware of diseconomies-of-scale in
equities, as large funds generate lower flow levels than small funds. This evidence is much stronger than a finding of
large funds gathering lower percentage flows.
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explain managers’ ability to attract greater flows among existing clients, but, notably, it is strongly
related to managers’ ability to acquire new clients. In light of the findings of Blake, et al. (2013) that
sponsors tend to allocate only a portion of assets previously assigned to a poorly-performing manager
to a new manager (and tend to be hesitant to fire the underperforming manager immediately), our
results indicate that this new allocation tends to go to a manager with stronger network connections
(and, thus, better expected future performance).
6 Risk-taking and network centrality
Section 3 established a positive association between fund-manager centrality and risk-adjusted invest-
ment performance. We next consider whether centrality a↵ects managers’ willingness to take risk, and
the consequences of such actions. Network centrality could a↵ect managers’ risk-taking for at least
two reasons. First, if more centrally placed managers have access to more precise information, they
may be willing to take what appears to outsiders to be riskier bets. Second, if more centrally-placed
managers are less likely to be fired for a given level of investment performance (as we find below),
then they should also be willing to take riskier bets. We also note the importance of controlling for
size in measuring risk-taking as larger managers will find it more di cult to deviate from the market
benchmark due to the greater market impact of their trades and less maneuverability, compared with
smaller managers.
6.1 Idiosyncratic risk and network centrality
We perform our analysis by proxying for the unobserved level of risk-taking by means of the level
of idiosyncratic risk taken by a fund manager. Specifically, using Equation (5), we first extract an
estimate of the fund-manager pairing’s idiosyncratic risk, |b"ijt|. Note that if these residuals are drawn
from a Gaussian distribution, then E[|b"ijt|] = p2/⇡ · STDEV (b"ijt), thus justifying this particular
proxy for risk. It should be recognized, however, that this is clearly a noisy measure of risk, as it is
based on a single observation for every period.
Because of this limitation, we undertake the following procedure. From |b✏ijt|, we subtract its
cross-sectional average, computed using all the fund-manager pairings available at each point in time
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to control for time-varying volatility in markets. We then compute the time-series average of the de-
meaned absolute residuals at the fund-manager level, and use this as our measure of risk. Finally, we
regress, at the fund-manager level, the average absolute residual on average centrality, fund-manager
size, and manager size, all normalized using the procedures described earlier.
Results from this regression are presented in Table 8. First, notice that fund-manager size as well
as manager size have a strongly negative e↵ect on risk-taking across di↵erent specifications: larger
fund-managers take on less active risk and mirror the benchmarks more closely. This makes sense, as
it is more di cult for large managers to deviate from the market.
For all three centrality measures we find that funds with higher centrality take on more risk than
less central funds. Moreover, the estimated slope coe cient on network centrality is highly statistically
significant for two of the three measures (degree and value-weighted prestige). This finding is consistent
with more central managers having higher levels of private information deriving from their network
position and pension fund sponsors (and consultants) tolerating this higher risk level because of the
associated higher level of expected performance.
6.2 Network centrality and hazards of being fired
Network centrality does not only a↵ect the information flowing to and from a particular manager or
consultant; it can also a↵ect the manager or consultant’s incentives. This can happen through its
e↵ect on flows of funds into and out of the funds under the manager’s (consultant’s) control and, thus,
the manager’s remuneration, which is likely to depend on the asset base; we analyzed this e↵ect in
Section 5. It can also happen through its e↵ect on the probability that the manager is fired by a
client. To investigate this second channel, we next analyze whether the probability that a manager is
fired is a↵ected by his network centrality.35
To assess whether a fund manager’s or consultant’s probability of being fired is influenced by his
position (centrality) in the network, we estimate hazard rate models. The hazard rate (h) measures
the probability of being fired next period, conditional on having survived up to the present time. To
35Previous studies have analyzed the factors influencing the likelihood of termination for mutual fund managers.
Chevalier and Ellison (1999) report that young managers face a higher risk of being fired following poor risk-adjusted
performance. Khorana (1996) finds that underperforming managers with decreasing inflows also face a higher probability
of being fired. For VC firms Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu (2007) find that the portfolio companies of more central VCs
are more likely to survive future financing rounds.
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avoid having to impose restrictions on how the baseline hazard rate depends on the duration (d) of
the relation between a manager and the pension fund, we use the Cox semi-parametric regression
approach.
Specifically, letting h(dijt) be the hazard rate for fund-manager i, j at time t and h0(dijt) be the
baseline hazard rate as a function of the duration of the fund-manager’s tenure at time t, dijt, we
estimate the following model
h(dijt) = h0(dijt) exp( 
0xijt). (14)
Our model allows the manager’s hazard rate to depend on four factors, xijt. First, we consider the
e↵ect of the duration of manager j’s relation with pension fund i at time t, dijt, measured in quarters.
This maps into the baseline hazard, h0(dijt) which shows how the probability that a manager is fired
in the subsequent quarter varies with the duration of the fund-manager contract. An upward-sloping
curve indicates that the manager’s risk of getting fired increases the longer his contract with a pension
fund, while a downward-sloping curve suggests that the manager is less likely to get fired, the longer
he has been with a particular pension fund. This part is estimated non-parametrically.
Second, we include Past Risk Adj Ret – constructed by value-weighting the risk-adjusted returns
across the various funds managed over the previous two quarters. The hypothesis here is that higher
past risk-adjusted returns should reduce the chance of a manager getting fired.
Third, we control for manager size, M SIZEjt, measured at the beginning of each quarter. We
found earlier that this matters for both return performance and fund flows and so it is natural to expect
this variable also to be important for managers’ prospects of getting fired. Here, the hypothesis is
that, after controlling for past return performance, large, established managers are less likely to get
fired than smaller managers.
Our final covariate is the centrality measure, NETjt, which is – alternatively – degree centrality,
value-weighted prestige centrality, or betweenness centrality. The hypothesis is that the more central
a manager is within the network, the less likely she is to get fired.
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In summary, our regression model for the hazard rate takes the following form:
h(dijt,Past Risk Adj Retijt,M SIZEjt, NETjt) =
h0(dijt) exp( 1Past Risk Adj Retijt +  2M SIZEjt +  3NETjt) + "ijt. (15)
The hazard rate increases monotonically in the duration of the fund-manager relation, tripling
from around 0.2 - 0.3% per quarter for managers with a tenure of 10 quarters to 0.6% per quarter for
managers with a tenure of 70 quarters. While some of this result may be due to a consultant allowing a
manager some number of quarters of “burn-in time” to learn about that manager’s skills, the firing rate
continues to increase as manager duration becomes very large–likely because such managers overuse
their strategy as they grow.
Panel A in Table 9 reports estimation results for the model in (15) fitted to the manager data. The
hazard rate, i.e., the risk that the manager is fired by a client, is significantly negatively related to past
performance. Higher past (risk-adjusted) performance is, thus, associated with a reduced probability
that a manager will be fired by the fund. Further, we estimate a large negative, and highly significant,
coe cient on manager size, suggesting that large managers face a lower probability of being fired.
Turning to network centrality, all three centrality measures generate coe cients that are negative
and significant at the 1% level. Thus, more central managers appear to face a greatly reduced chance
of being fired, compared with more peripheral managers.
Panel B of Table 9 shows results from estimating (15) on the consultant data. Past average return
performance is no longer a significant predictor of firing events. Consultant size, on the other hand,
remains strongly negatively related to the firing probability. Interestingly, consultant centrality is,
once again, a negative and significant predictor of future firings across all three centrality measures.
These results establish a strong case that managers’ and consultants’ network centrality negatively
a↵ects their probability of being fired, most likely because of the higher expected future performance
associated with higher levels of network centrality.
30
7 Conclusion
Decentralized investment management is the process by which assets of institutional investors are
managed by professional money managers. Not only do institutions such as pension funds employ
multiple fund managers, but these fund management houses manage the assets of many pension
funds, creating a network of linkages between fund managers and the investment consultants who
advise the pension funds. In this paper we use a unique data set on UK pension funds to examine the
relation between network centrality measures and fund manager performance, risk taking, fund flows
and fund manager tenure – questions that have not previously been addressed in a setting similar to
ours.
Our approach analyzes the centrality of the fund’s management company by examining the number
of connections it has with other management companies through their commonality in managing for
the same fund sponsors or through the same fund consultants. Network centrality is found to be posi-
tively associated with risk-adjusted return performance and growth in assets under management, after
controlling for size and past performance. Moreover, the importance of network centrality is strongest
for larger funds, controlling for economies of scale e↵ects. Better connected fund managers also take
on higher levels of risk and are less likely to be fired after spells of low performance, demonstrating
how network centrality a↵ect fund managers’ incentives.
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Appendix A Size and network centrality: Granger causality tests
Table 2 shows that a manager’s size and network centrality are positively correlated. Large managers
are likely to manage the assets of more clients and so this finding does not come as a surprise. While
it can be di cult to formally test if size causes centrality or vice versa, more limited tests of whether
one variable precedes the other one are feasible through Granger causality tests.
To implement such Granger causality tests, we first obtain the centrality measure for each manager
at each point in time. Similarly, we compute the size of each manager by aggregating investments
in all the funds (and asset classes) managed by the manager. We then regress changes in log-size on
its own lag and the lag of changes in degree centrality. Because the lagged size and lagged centrality
measures are not exogenous, we instrument them using their own lags. To be precise, we use the
Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) panel estimation method described below to conduct Granger
causality tests for the relation between size and network centrality in a panel setting.
Specifically, consider the simple panel model:
yit =  0 +
mX
l=1
 lyit l +
mX
l=1
 lxit l + i + uit. (A1)
The model in (A1) can be estimated by pooled OLS that imposes the constraint that the underlying
structure is the same for each cross-sectional unit. It allows, however, for an individual specific
intercept,  i. It also allows the variance of the innovation in (A1) to vary with the cross-sectional
unit, so as to capture individual heterogeneity in the variability of y.
First-di↵erencing (A1) yields
yit   yit 1 =
mX
l=1
 l(yit l   yit l 1) +
mX
l=1
 l(xit l   xit l 1) + vit, (A2)
where vit = uit   uit 1.
Estimation
To estimate the model, define N⇥1 vectors of observations on the various units at a given time period,
Yt = (Y1t, ..., YNt)0 and Xt = (X1t, ..., XNt)0. Let Wt = (eN , Yt 1, ..., Yt m, Xt 1, ..., Xt m) be the
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matrix of regressors, where eN is an N⇥1 vector of ones. Further, let Vt = (v1t, ..., vmt)0 be the vector
of transformed disturbance terms and let B = (a,  1, ..., m,  1, ...,  m)0 be the vector of coe cients.
Then we can write (A2) as:
Yt =WtB+Vt. (A3)
Stacking the observations for each time period, we can simplify this to a system
Y =WB+V. (A4)
Finally, defining a set of instrumental variables, Z, we estimate B from the equation
Z0Y = Z0WB+ Z0V. (A5)
This specification makes it easy to test whether the coe cients on the x variables are jointly equal
to zero by imposing simple linear restrictions and then computing the likelihood ratio test comparing
the restricted and unrestricted model.
Our implementation uses one-step GMM estimation and the Arellano-Bond estimator and limits
the instruments to a maximum of 16 lags.36 We separately consider degree, value-weighted prestige
and betweenness centrality measures.
Empirical findings
Table A1 presents the outcome of the Granger causality tests described above as applied to our data.
Panel A uses centrality as the dependent variable, while lagged size and lagged centrality are used
as independent variables. In all instances, lagged size fails to significantly predict centrality, leading
to the conclusion that size does not Granger-cause network centrality. As expected, lagged centrality
predicts current centrality, consistent with the persistence in the centrality measures revealed in plots
such as Figure 4.
Panel B of Table A1 performs the reverse regression, regressing current size on lagged centrality and
36We have 81 observations in the time-series and the number of instruments would become unmanageably large
otherwise.
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past size. Here we find that centrality strongly (and positively) predicts future size, after controlling for
past size. Thus, network centrality Granger-causes size, but not the reverse. This result is consistent
across all centrality measures. Moreover, the results are robust to the number of lags chosen.37
The conclusion from these results is that network centrality adds a novel dimension to our un-
derstanding of managers’ investment performance, risk-taking behavior, and fund flows. Moreover,
network centrality, though positively related to size, is clearly not subsumed by size. In fact, al-
though size and network centrality are positively correlated, size generally has a negative e↵ect on
investment performance and fund inflows while conversely network centrality is associated with better
risk-adjusted performance and higher inflows.
Appendix B Results controlling for centrality in other asset classes
To the extent that the benefits from network connections arise due to managers’ improved ability to
receive and process information on the strategies of other managers, we would expect that centrality
within a specific asset class would matter more than centrality established through other asset classes.
For example, a manager’s network connections in the UK equity market should be more relevant than
the same manager’s connections in UK bonds, when it comes to receiving information on strategies
that work in UK equity markets.
To assess the impact of asset-class-specific centrality on performance, we modify the procedure in
Section 3.1 as follows. For UK equities, we run panel regressions that include network centrality in
UK equities as well as centrality in UK bonds. Because the two centrality measures are correlated
with each other, we orthogonalize the centrality in UK bonds with respect to the centrality in UK
equities at the fund-manager level.38 Our baseline specification includes centrality in UK equities and
the orthogonalized centrality measure for UK bonds. An extended specification includes interactions
37We also computed panel Granger causality tests for the relation between quarterly return performance, aggregated
across asset classes, and network centrality. The procedure adopted is virtually identical to that described above, with
the exception that we control for the e↵ect of manager size, SIZE M , which we found has an important impact on
performance. The results suggest that performance does not Granger-cause centrality. Conversely, our results indicate
that network centrality Granger-causes future performance. A more central position in the network thus seems to precede
improvements in managers’ return performance, while the opposite relation does not hold.
38In particular, we regress — at the fund-manager level — UK bond fund centrality on UK equity fund centrality. We
then store the residuals, which represent the portion of UK bond fund centrality that is orthogonal with respect to UK
equity fund centrality.
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of these terms with manager size.
Appendix Table A3 reports results from these regressions. The results show that, after accounting
for network connections within UK equities, the performance of UK equity managers is either nega-
tively a↵ected, or insignificantly a↵ected by additional network connections established through the
management of UK bond portfolios (and the coe cient on bond centrality is generally much lower,
compared to the coe cient on equity centrality). Conversely, the coe cient on network centrality
established in UK equities is significant in each model, either alone or when interacted with size. The
results remain the same when we interact the centrality measures with manager size: centrality in UK
equities generates positive and significant coe cients for this asset class, while centrality in UK bonds
generates either negative or insignificant coe cients. These results suggest that asset-class-specific
network connections are important in explaining manager performance and also lend support to the
hypothesis that the network centrality measure captures fund managers’ ability to gather and process
information on strategies of importance to risk-adjusted performance within their asset class, and that
the centrality measure is not merely acting as a proxy for an omitted variable.
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Figure 1. Example of network relations in the UK pension fund industry
Panel A. Extended-form representation
Cons 1 Cons 2
Fund 1 Fund 2 Fund 3 Fund 4 Fund 5
$1 $2 $3 $2 $3
$2 $1
$2
$3 $3
Mng 1 Mng 2 Mng 3 Mng 4 Mng 5
Panel B. Reduced-form representation
Cons 1 Cons 2
Mng 1 Mng 2
Mng 3
Mng 4
Mng 5
$3 $5 $1 $3
$2 $5 $3
$5
$5 $8
$4
$6
Panel C. Centrality of managers and consultants according to
di↵erent measures of centrality
Cons 1 Cons 2 Mng 1 Mng 2 Mng 3 Mng 4 Mng 5
Degree 0.500 0.667 0.333 0.833 0.500 0.833 0.333
Value-weighted prestige 0.214 0.309 0.190 0.618 0.262 0.571 0.214
Betweenness 0.111 0.178 0.000 0.556 0.000 0.489 0.000
This figure plots an example of the network connections generated by the interplay of five pension funds
(Fund 1 through Fund 5), two consultants (Cons 1 and Cons 2) and five managers (Mng 1 through Mng
5). The figure plots the case where: Fund 1 is advised by Cons 1 and employs Mng 1; Fund 2 is advised
by Cons 1 and employs Mng 1 and Mng 2; Fund 3 is advised by Cons 1 and employs Mng 2 and Mng 4;
Fund 4 is advised by Cons 2 and employs Mng 2, Mng 3, and Mng 4; and Fund 5 is advised by Cons 2
and employs Mng 4 and Mng 5. Panel A reports the extended-form representation of the network, as it
displays the full set of connections involving pension funds, managers, and consultants. Panel B reports
the reduced-form representation of the network, as it displays only the connections between managers
and consultants. In Panel B, the green lines represent consultant-to-manager connections, while blue
lines represent manager-to-manager connections – arising from co-managing the same fund. In Panel A,
the numbers on the lines that connect the funds to the managers indicate the size of the mandate. In
Panel B, they indicate the total assets under management associated with the manager-to-consultant and
the manager-to-manager connections – computed across all funds. Panel C reports the value of degree,
value-weighted prestige and betweenness centralities for all managers and consultants.
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Figure 2. Network connections in UK equities
(A) Year : 1984
(B) Year : 1994
(C) Year : 2004
This figure plots the network connections in UK equities at three points in time during our sample, namely 1984, 1994,
and 2004. The red circles represent individual managers, while the black diamonds in the horizontal row represent the 12
consultants. Next to each node is shown the code of the manager or consultant. Managers whose nodes are shown above
the consultants are only connected through the consultants, while the managers whose nodes fall below the consultants are
connected with at least one other manager.
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Figure 4. Average network centrality over time
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This figure plots the time series of the average degree, value-weighted prestige and betweenness centralities for UK equities.
In each panel, each centrality measure NETt is standardized as follows
S NETt =
NETt  MEAN(NETt)
STDEV (NETt)
,
where MEAN(NETt) is the time-series mean of the average centrality measure NETt and STDEV (NETt) is its standard
deviation.
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Figure 5. Combined e↵ect of manager size and network degree centrality on performance
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(A) UK equities
This figure plots the combined e↵ect of manager size and degree centrality on risk-adjusted performance for UK equities. To
compute these quantities, we focus on particular percentiles of the fund-manager size (SIZE) and manager size (M SIZE):
we use, alternatively, the 75th, 90th or 95th percentiles of the size distributions, while we allow the centrality measure NET
to vary across its full support. The coe cients used are the ones reported in the second column of Panel A of Table 2. As an
example, consider the case of the 75-th percentile of SIZE and M SIZE and denote them as SIZE 75 and M SIZE 75.
We report the results of the following calculation:
Combined Effect of Manager Size and Centrality =  0.292⇥ SIZE 75
  0.722⇥M SIZE 75 + 0.042⇥NET
+ 0.365⇥NET ⇥M SIZE 75,
where we let NET range 0.07 through 4.08.
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Table 3. Return correlations for connected and non-connected managers
Correlation-type Connected managers Non-connected managers Di↵. P-val. Obs.
Returns 0.954 0.949 0.005 0.649 139
Factor-explained returns 0.978 0.978 0.000 0.968 139
Residuals 0.170 0.096 0.074 0.000 139
This table compares – for UK equities – return correlations between managers that are connected to each other and managers
that are not connected to each other. Performance is measured as returns (first row), factor-explained returns (second row),
and return residuals (third row). The results for returns are computed as follows. We first compute returns at the manager
level by value-weighting the returns in each fund managed by a given manager. We then compute return correlations between
each manager and every other manager contained in the dataset, making sure to use only manager pairings that overlap for at
least 12 quarters. Third, for each manager, we average the return correlations associated with connected and non-connected
managers. Fourth, for connections and non-connections, we compute the median of the average correlations across all the
managers in the dataset. Finally, we compute tests of di↵erences in medians across the two sets of correlations based on
two-sided permutation tests that use 1,000 iterations. The procedure is repeated for other measures of performance, i.e.,
factor-explained returns and return residuals.
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Table 4. Network e↵ect of the merger between two consultants
Degree Value-weighted prestige Betweenness
Treatment⇥NET 0.153 0.087 0.074
(0.02) (0.08) (0.09)
NET 0.193 0.318 0.221
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00)
SIZE -0.281 -0.285 -0.284
(0.14) (0.13) (0.14)
M SIZE -0.646 -0.679 -0.617
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
This table reports the e↵ect of a shock to network centrality – due to the merger of two consultants – on risk-adjusted
performance in UK equities. In the first step we compute the risk-adjusted return of manager j in fund i at time t asbradjijt = b↵ij + b✏ijt, where b↵ij is estimated using the full set of observations available for manager j in fund i. We adopt a
four-factor model:
rijt = ↵ij +  1ij rmkt,t +  2ij SMBt +  3ij HMLt +  4ij MOMt + ✏ijt,
where rmkt,t is the excess return on the UK stock market index, SMBt is a size factor, HMLt is a value-growth factor and
MOMt is a momentum factor. We drop from the sample the fund-manager pairings that have less than 12 observations.
In the second step, we estimate
bradjijt = aij + bt +  1SIZEijt +  2M SIZEjt +  3NETjt +  4NETjt ⇥M Dummyjt + "ijt,
where the merger treatment dummyM Dummyjt is switched on for 3 years for all managers a↵ected by the merger between
the two consultants Mercer and Sedgwick – that occurred on October 1, 1998. The panel regressions use as control variables
the assets under management of each fund-manager pairing (denoted by SIZE), as well as each manager’s assets under
management in UK equities across all funds managed (denoted by M SIZE). The centrality measures of interest are
degree centrality, value-weighted prestige centrality and betweenness centrality. The size variables are converted to relative
size by dividing them by the cross-sectional average and taking the natural log of this quantity. The centrality measure
NET is converted to relative centrality by dividing each entry by the cross-sectional average. Each covariate series has
been standardized using its own unconditional standard deviation to ease the interpretation of the coe cients. All the
specifications use fund-manager and time fixed e↵ects. The p-values are reported in parentheses and are computed using
standard errors that are clustered at the fund-manager level.
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Table 5. Consultant alphas in UK equities
Annualized alphas
Consultant 1 0.091
(0.51)
Consultant 2 0.071
(0.58)
Consultant 3 0.006
(0.96)
Consultant 4 -0.645
(0.06)
Consultant 5 0.075
(0.69)
Consultant 6 -0.070
(0.74)
Consultant 7 -0.019
(0.97)
Consultant 8 -0.035
(0.91)
Consultant 11 -0.202
(0.11)
This table reports the annualized consultant alphas in UK equities. In particular, it reports the ↵c
coe cients associated with the following regression in UK equities:
rict = k + ↵c +  1ic rmkt,t +  2ic SMBt +  3ic HMLt +  4ic MOMt + ✏ict,
where i refers to the fund, c refers to the consultant and t refers to the time period. Notice that we allow
for consultant-fund di↵erences by allowing the betas to di↵er across consultant-fund pairings. Standard
errors are clustered at the fund-consultant level.
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Table 7. Fund flows and manager centrality
Panel A. Flows from newly assigned mandates
Degree Value-weighted prestige Betweenness
NET 16.182 10.241 10.146
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Lag F low 0.080 0.079 0.081
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
M SIZE -7.711 -1.635 -2.273
(0.00) (0.55) (0.29)
Past Risk Adj Ret 0.597 0.525 0.529
(0.24) (0.28) (0.27)
Panel B. Flows from existing mandates
Degree Value-weighted prestige Betweenness
NET 9.879 18.493 0.088
(0.40) (0.32) (0.99)
Lag F low 0.107 0.102 0.108
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
M SIZE -22.783 -23.939 -16.631
(0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
Past Risk Adj Ret 1.841 1.743 1.826
(0.10) (0.12) (0.10)
This table reports panel regression results for the e↵ect of manager centrality, size and past performance on fund inflows
and outflows from existing mandates and newly assigned mandates. For newly assigned mandates (Panel A), the fund-flow
variable for manager j over quarter t is the value of the newly assigned mandates. For existing mandates (Panel B), the
fund-flow variable for manager i over quarter t is defined as:
F lowjt+1 =
✓
M SIZEjt+1  M SIZEjt
M SIZEjt
 Rjt:t+1
◆
M SIZEjt,
where M SIZEjt and M SIZEjt+1 are the starting market values (of existing mandates) of manager j’s asset holdings at
quarter t and t + 1 and Rjt:t+1 is the return generated over quarter t. The analysis is performed for UK equities and the
centrality measures of interest are degree centrality, value-weighted prestige centrality, and betweenness centrality – computed
in UK equities. The size variable M SIZE denotes the total assets under management (across all funds managed) of each
manager at each point in time. For each manager, Past Risk Adj Ret is constructed by value-weighting the risk-adjusted
returns in a given asset class across the funds managed over the previous year. Risk-adjusted returns are computed using the
model described in the caption of Table 2. We convert the size variable to relative size by dividing it by the cross-sectional
average and taking the natural log of this quantity. The centrality measures are converted to relative centrality by dividing
them by the cross-sectional average. Each covariate series – with the exception of lagged-flows – has been standardized
using its own unconditional standard deviation to ease the interpretation of the coe cients. All results are computed using
manager and time fixed e↵ects. P -values (reported in parentheses) are computed using standard errors that are clustered at
the manager level.
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Table 8. Centrality and fund-manager risk
Degree Value-weighted prestige Betweenness
NET 0.258 0.487 0.072
(0.00) (0.00) (0.29)
SIZE -0.375 -0.364 -0.403
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
M SIZE -0.567 -0.702 -0.390
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
This table reports results for cross-sectional regressions of fund-managers’ risk in UK equities on manager degree centrality
(first column), value-weighted prestige centrality (second column) and betweenness centrality (third column). The results
are computed by regressing the average risk of each fund-manager pairing on average fund-manager size, manager centrality,
and manager size. We take |b✏ijt| (described further below) as the measure of risk for manager j in fund i at time t. We then
subtract the cross-sectional average, computed using all the fund-manager pairings available at each point in time. Third,
we compute the time-series average of the de-meaned absolute residuals at the fund-manager level and use it as our average
risk variable. We repeat a similar procedure for managers’ centrality, managers’ size, and fund-managers’ size. In particular,
the size variables are converted to relative size by dividing them by the cross-sectional average and taking the natural log of
this quantity. The centrality measures are converted to relative centrality by dividing them by the cross-sectional average.
Finally, we regress, at the fund-manager level, the average absolute residual on average centrality (NET ), fund-manager
size (denoted by SIZE), manager size (M SIZE). Each covariate series has been standardized using its own unconditional
standard deviation to ease the interpretation of the coe cients. P -values are reported in parentheses. To compute |b✏ijt|, we
use a four-factor model:
rijt = ↵ij +  1ij rmkt,t +  2ij SMBt +  3ij HMLt +  4ij MOMt + ✏ijt,
where rmkt,t is the excess return on the UK stock market index, SMBt is a size factor, HMLt is a value-growth factor and
MOMt is a momentum factor. We drop from the sample the fund-manager pairings that have less than 12 observations.
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Table 9. Survival analysis for managers and consultants
Panel A. Analysis at the manager level
Degree Value-weighted prestige Betweenness
Past Risk Adj Ret -0.083 -0.089 -0.089
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SIZE -0.192 -0.199 -0.208
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NET -0.332 -0.415 -0.378
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Panel B. Analysis at the consultant level
Degree Value-weighted prestige Betweenness
Past Risk Adj Ret -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.99) (0.96) (0.99)
SIZE -0.299 -0.282 -0.315
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NET -0.099 -0.035 -0.110
(0.00) (0.13) (0.00)
This table reports in Panel A (Panel B) the coe cients from a Cox proportional hazard rate model relating the probability
of managers’ (consultants’) contracts being terminated in UK equities to their past performance, their size, as well as their
network centrality. In Panel A, SIZE denotes the assets under management of each fund-manager pairing. In Panel B,
SIZE denotes the assets under management of each fund-consultant pairing. Past performance (Past Risk Adj Ret) is
computed as the average abnormal returns in UK equities over the previous two quarters for each fund-manager pairing in
Panel A and for each fund-consultant pairing in Panel B. In Panel A the centrality measure of interest are managers’ degree
centrality, value-weighted prestige centrality and betweenness centrality. In Panel B the centrality measure of interest are
consultants’ degree centrality, value-weighted prestige centrality and betweenness centrality. The size variables are converted
to relative size by dividing them by the cross-sectional average and taking the natural log of this quantity. The centrality
measures are converted to relative centrality by dividing them by the cross-sectional average. Each covariate series has
been standardized using its own unconditional standard deviation to ease the interpretation of the coe cients. P -values are
reported in parentheses.
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Table A1. Granger causality tests of size versus network centrality
Panel A. Dependent variable: centrality measure
Degree Value-weighted prestige Betweenness
M SIZE -0.001 -0.438 -0.000
(0.39) (0.01) (0.86)
NET 0.885 0.965 0.900
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Panel B. Dependent variable: size
Degree Value-weighted prestige Betweenness
M SIZE 0.619 0.650 0.650
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NET 2.321 0.002 3.452
(0.00) (0.10) (0.00)
This table reports the results of panel Granger causality tests for manager size and centrality. Manager centrality is computed
– alternatively – as degree centrality, value-weighted prestige centrality and betweenness centrality and all measures of
centrality are computed across all asset classes managed. Manager size is computed as the log of the total assets under
management across funds and asset classes. The dependent variable is manager centrality in Panel A and manager size
in Panel B. The parameters are estimated using a one-step GMM that uses up to 16 lags of the dependent variable as
instruments. Details of the procedure are reported in Appendix B of the paper. P -values are reported in parentheses and
are computed using robust standard errors.
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Table A2. Network centrality and performance
Manager-to-manager and consultant-to-manager degree centrality
SIZE -0.287 -0.302
(0.14) (0.12)
M SIZE -0.668 -0.677
(0.00) (0.00)
DEG C 0.130 0.129
(0.08) (0.08)
DEG M 0.119 0.126
(0.17) (0.15)
Consultant fixed-e↵ects
Fund-manager fixed-e↵ects
Time fixed-e↵ects
This table reports results for panel regressions of fund-managers’ risk-adjusted performance in UK equities on managers’
degree centrality computed using manager-manager connections (DEG M) and consultant-manager connections (DEG C).
The risk-adjusted return of manager j in fund i at time t is computed as bradjijt = b↵ij + b✏ijt, where b↵ij is estimated using
return observations on manager j’s account in fund i. We adopt a four-factor model:
rijt = ↵ij +  1ij rmkt,t +  2ij SMBt +  3ij HMLt +  4ij MOMt + ✏ijt,
where rmkt,t is the excess return on the UK stock market index, SMBt is a size factor, HMLt is a value-growth factor and
MOMt is a momentum factor. We drop from the sample the fund-manager pairings that have less than 12 observations.
The panel regressions use as control variables the assets under management in UK equities of each fund-manager pairing
(SIZE), as well as each manager’s assets under management in UK equities across all funds managed (M SIZE). The
size variables are converted to relative size by dividing them by the cross-sectional average and taking the natural log of
this quantity. The centrality measures are converted to relative centrality by dividing them by the cross-sectional average.
Each covariate series has been standardized using its own unconditional standard deviation to ease the interpretation of the
coe cients. For each centrality measure we adopt four specifications. The first two columns do not include consultant fixed
e↵ects, while the remaining two columns do. Furthermore, the first and third columns include only the centrality measure,
while the second and fourth columns include the centrality measure and its interaction with manager size. All specifications
use fund-manager and time fixed e↵ects. P -values (reported in parentheses) are computed using standard errors that are
clustered at the fund-manager level.
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Table A3. E↵ect of centrality on performance in UK equities,
controlling for centrality in UK bonds
Specification 1 Specification 2
SIZE -0.285 -0.291
(0.14) (0.13)
M SIZE -0.619 -0.709
(0.00) (0.00)
NET BONDS -0.070 -0.084
(0.00) (0.00)
NET EQUITIES 0.179 0.022
(0.06) (0.83)
NET BONDS ⇥M SIZE -0.053
(0.00)
NET EQUITIES ⇥M SIZE 0.363
(0.00)
This table reports results for panel regressions of fund-managers’ risk-adjusted performance in UK equities on managers’
centrality. The risk-adjusted return of manager j in fund i at time t is computed as bradjijt = b↵ij +b✏ijt, where b↵ij is estimated
using return observations on manager j’s account in fund i. We adopt a four-factor model for UK equities:
rijt = ↵ij +  1ij rmkt,t +  2ij SMBt +  3ij HMLt +  4ij MOMt + ✏ijt,
where rmkt,t is the excess return on the UK stock market index, SMBt is a size factor, HMLt is a value-growth factor and
MOMt is a momentum factor. We drop from the sample the fund-manager pairings that have less than 12 observations.
The centrality measure of interest is degree centrality (NET EQUITIES), computed in UK equities. The degree centrality
measure computed for UK bonds (NET BONDS) is used as control and is orthogonalized with respect to NET EQUITIES
at the fund-manager level. We use as additional control variables the assets under management in UK equities of each fund-
manager pairing (denoted by SIZE), as well as each manager’s assets under management in UK equities across all funds
managed (M SIZE). The size variables are converted to relative size by dividing them by the cross-sectional average and
taking the natural log of this quantity. The centrality measures are converted to relative centrality by dividing them by the
cross-sectional average. Each covariate series has been standardized using its own unconditional standard deviation to ease
the interpretation of the coe cients. We adopt two specifications. In the first we include only the centrality measures. In the
second we include the centrality measures and their interaction with manager size. All the specifications use fund-manager
and time fixed e↵ects. P -values (reported in parentheses) are computed using standard errors that are clustered at the
fund-manager level.
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